What If…
A Soviet victory in the race for the atomic bomb could have meant a very different Cold War
When physicists Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch discovered nuclear fission in December 1938, the possibility of an atomic weapon became a frightening reality. Scientists from several countries began work, seeking to produce such a device. However, after being invaded by Nazi Germany in 1941, the Soviet Union chose instead to focus efforts on repelling the enemy. Meanwhile, in the United States, the Manhattan Project saw a team of experts led by J Robert Oppenheimer devote vast resources to ensuring America were the leaders in the race. In 1945, Oppenheimer was ultimately victorious, but what if the bomb had fallen first into the hands of the Soviet Union? Would the weapon have been detonated not over Hiroshima, but Berlin? Would we still have had the Cold War?
What exactly was the Soviet atomic project and how did it fit into the wider race for the bomb taking place during the 1940s?
When nuclear fission was discovered at the end of 1938, Soviet scientists were as excited about the discovery as physicists in other countries. They did work on investigating the possibility of a nuclear fission chain reaction, as either a power reactor or an explosive reaction – a bomb.
But in June of 1941, when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, the work was ended. There were much more immediate tasks at hand because the German armies advanced rapidly and were quickly able to threaten Moscow. Despite this, the Soviet Union did learn about the work going on, initially in Britain and then in the United States, through their intelligence service. Perhaps most importantly they were able to obtain a copy of the MAUD report, which was a classified report investigating the possibility of using uranium to construct a bomb. One of the famous Cambridge Five spies transmitted the report to Moscow in October of 1941, at almost exactly the same time it was being briefed to President Roosevelt in Washington DC. So the Soviet Union was on a par with the US in terms of scientific knowledge regarding an atomic weapon.
However, while the report helped to speed up the Manhattan Project it was largely ignored by the Soviet Union. Lavrentiy Beria, who was head of Soviet intelligence, feared that it was a scam designed to distract them. Additionally, the prospect of a bomb in two or three years, which is essentially what the MAUD report stated, didn’t seem very interesting when you’re desperately trying to defend Moscow against the German attack. Howeve
