For almost four years the peninsula was host to a conflict fought unlike any previous war, with largely WWII-era arms, armour and tactics gradually giving way to new weapons and strategies
History shows that when conducting consecutive wars, military leaders fight the ‘next’ war with doctrine, equipment and tactics stemming from the previous. If it worked last time, the prevailing wisdom has been that it should work now. Training and tactics take a long time to change, and with most armed forces the rate of change is slow. A prime example of this is the Second World War where the frontlines were – for the most part – clearly defined and continuous, without gaps or separation between defending units. Commanders advanced their troops into enemy territory carefully, safe in the knowledge their enemy was predominantly in front of them. In the next major conflict, the Korean War (1950-53), these conditions would be turned on their head. But why? The answer, in part, is terrain, in part resources.
Out with the new, in with the old
The Korean peninsula, then as now, is made up of mountainous terrain with high peaks and low valleys, limiting the use of the large-manoeuvre tactics that had seen such success less than a decade prior. The peninsula’s narrow valleys did not lend themselves to large armoured columns because the proximity of steep slopes and sharp peaks left these columns vulnerable – from below and above – to a variety of the latest anti-armour weapons.
Equally, the high peaks made it difficult for artillery to hit their targets, as shell trajectories were basically blocked by the mountaintops. Similarly, the air forces had a harder time manoeuvring between the peaks to perform close air support (CAS) to aid the ground forces in their task.
In the beginning of the war, the North Korean and Chinese forces used less artillery, fewer air units and no armour in their offensives, instead relying on infantry, par ticularly armed with machine guns. They also used the cover of night and the terrain to their advantage, and moved through the American and Allied lines to attack rear echelon troops such as supply units or artillery positions.
These changes in tactics and use of equipment, necessitated by the terrain, destroyed any possibilities of forming a traditional, continuous, linear defence in which a wall of defenders holds a straight line, with the main object of preventing penetration at any point. The mountainous terrain of the Korean peninsula and the preference to use infantry in quite large volumes gave the effect of a crenellated line, with separate garrisons operating hedgehog defences and perimeters, which an enemy could attack from a
