AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS
Underwhelming, under-resourced, incohesive and overconfident – England’s failed naval attack on Portugal was a moment of hubris for the fledgling empire
The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 is firmly embedded within English mythology. The ‘Virgin Queen’ Elizabeth I’s crowning military achievement established her realm as the ruler of the waves and began the nation’s journey towards becoming a global superpower. However, what is often forgotten is the underwhelming subsequent attack by the ‘English Armada’. In 1589, in an attempt to capitalise on the victory against the Spanish the previous year, Elizabeth and her advisors organised an ambitious naval campaign under the command of Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Norris. It had three main objectives: destroy the remaining Spanish navy, most of which was being rebuilt on the Cantabrian Coast; take Lisbon and install António, Prior of Crato as king of Portugal; and capture the Azores Islands to help establish English control over Atlantic trade routes.
However, much like the Spanish Armada, this ambitious amphibious plan was plagued by problems from the start. Frequent disagreements about how the English fleet should attack Portugal and support António’s bid for power, the nature and level of involvement of the Dutch troops, and bad weather were all factors that delayed or hampered the early days of this campaign.
Additionally, the Tudor court’s inexperience when it came to launching massive naval forces also played a part in its disorganisation and sluggishness. Until the reign of Elizabeth, the Tudor navy had primarily been used as a defensive force and had been largely untouched since Henry VIII’s death. Elizabeth and her advisors’ plan for it to be used offensively, the opposite of its traditional function, presented a shock to the system.
Between setting off from England on 28 April 1589 and getting to the shores of Lisbon at the end of May, the English conducted several attacks across the coast. Two of the most well-known of these amphibious assaults were the unsuccessful, unapproved, attack on La Coruna and the capture of Peniche. The failure to capture La Coruna after being repelled by the locals not only used up English resources and time, it also severely demoralised the soldiers. Losing the support of its forces so early in the campaign was dangerous for the English. The capture of Peniche, on the other hand, was used as a springboard by the English to begin their assault on Lisbon. It was also at this point that Drake and Norris were joined by Robert Devereux, Second Earl of Essex, who frequently acted irrationally and had been described as having a “nature not to be ruled”. His arrival in this campaign created further issues for the assault on the Spanish.
At Peniche, Drake and Norris split the
