AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS
The events of this engagement have been largely eclipsed by the feat of the messenger Pheidippides. However, the Greeks’ repulse of the Persian invasion was a brilliant tactical display
During the 5th centur y BCE, the Achaemenid Empire, or the First Persian Empire, was the largest and most powerful empire in the world. It boasted a large and successful militar y that had recently conquered large parts of Eastern Europe and the Indus Valley. Emperor Darius I was flexing his considerable might within his sphere of influence, with the Greek city states next in his sights. After Athens and Eretria suppor ted a number of uprisings against the Persians, Darius’ army quickly responded by turning their weapons on the Greeks. The Persians defeated the Eretrians in just three days, before embarking on the journey to quash Athens for their perceived insolence.
Possibly in late August, more likely early September 490 BCE (precise dating is notoriously difficult in classical contexts) the Persians, under the command of Admiral Datis and Darius’ nephew Ar taphernes, used 600 triremes to move their army to the Bay of Marathon, around 25 miles (40km) north of Athens. The sheer size of the Persian militar y made this the most ambitious and strongest amphibious assault the world had ever seen. The bay was chosen because its flat plains made the perfect landing site for their cavalr y, as Athens’ former tyrant Hippias, now a Persian ally, had advised. This kind of terrain would also suit the Persian archers. Ancient historians placed the Persian army at anywhere between 100,000 to 200,000 men, however this is probably an exaggeration. Modern historians estimate that the army stood at around 25,000 to 30,000.
The Athenians had kept their forces, which were about 10,000-strong, prepared for the Persian attack, and as soon as their arrival in the bay was reported the Athenians marched to Marathon. The bay only had one route in and out through the hills that surrounded it, and the Athenians held their defensive position here. This prevented the Persians from moving inland and the Athenians hoped the enemy would get caught in a bottleneck, making the protection of Greece slightly easier in the expectation that the Spartans would arrive in time after their religious festival had concluded. What followed was a tense five-day stand-off, occasionally punctured by minor skirmishes, between the Greek and Persian forces.
At around dawn on the morning of the battle, the Persians were busy loading their cavalry onto their boats in preparation for an atta
