BY IAN S. LUSTICK
HISTORY
In the aftermath of the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, Israel declared an ever expanding list of war aims, ranging from the return of all hostages to the creation of a buffer zone separating Israel from Gaza’s population. Yet no Israeli leader has explained how the military campaign, even as it has destroyed much of the Strip, could possibly achieve its objectives. That’s because it can’t—and they know it. ▶
This very situation has existed in almost every Israeli war since 1948 because the country’s problems are political in nature, not something military force alone can solve. This reality means that instead of Operation Swords of Iron ending upon completion of Israeli objectives, it will end—as other Israeli wars have—when leading nations (often the U.S.) determine that its military has gone too far.
It’s a dynamic rooted in the history of Israel. In November 1947, in the wake of the Holocaust, the U.N. passed a resolution recommending the end of British Mandate Palestine and the creation of two independent states in the region: one Arab and one Jewish. A civil war between Jewish and Palestinian forces and a chaotic abandonment of Palestine by British forces soon ensued. When Israel declared independence in May 1948, its Arab neighbors attacked. Israeli forces prevailed on almost all fronts, and roughly 750,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled. The war ended only when Israel’s leaders became fearful of British military intervention.
In 1956, after Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and struck an arms deal with the Soviet Union, Israel, along with Britain and France, invaded Egypt. Israel left the territories it occupied during that conflict only when U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower threatened direct and painful retribution if it failed to do so. The pattern continued in June 1967: Egypt, Syria, and Jordan threatened to attack; Israel responded with a devastating pre-emptive strike. The U.N. Security Council ordered a cease-fire, but Israel did not stop fighting until the U.S. and the U.N. pressured Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan into an abrupt cease-fire.
In October 1973, after Egypt and Syria waged a surprise assault on Israeli positions in the Sinai and Golan Heights, Israeli forces slowly gained the upper hand and began a drive to isolate and destroy the Egyptian Third Army. It halted this campaign only because U.S. President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger insisted.
