Russia suspected of 63-hour attack on gps signals in the baltic region

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Russia is suspected of launching a 63-hour-long attack on GPS signals in the Baltic region, starting on 31 March, Easter Sunday, in a move that affected more than 1,600 passenger planes, as well as other GPS users.

The incident, which saw at least 1,614 planes affected, occurred amid rising tensions between Russia and the NATO military alliance more than two years since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

‘Seafarers should continue to be aware of the potential for electronic interference and notify their flag state of any suspicious activity,’ a spokesman for the Department for Transport told YM. ‘The Department for Transport provides security advice to British-flagged shipping, including areas of potential increased risk from electronic interference.’

WIDESPREAD DISRUPTION

While most of the GPS attacks appeared to be taking place in Polish airspace, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) blogs have reported that planes flying in German, Danish, Swedish, Latvian and Lithuanian airspace have suffered interference problems.

The missing or fake GPS signals — known as GPS jamming or spoofing — have been occurring regularly since the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022.

The loss of GPS signals is also significant for yachtsmen. Were similar GPS blackouts to occur in coastal areas, it could mean that yachtsmen lose their primary source of position fixing as well as the loss of accurate AIS data for collision avoidance, the loss of some input data for autopilots as well as a loss of GPS functionality for distress signalling, whether via VHF DSC or via GMDSS satellites such as EPIRB/PLB and/or AIS beacons.

Although any GPS data sent over AIS is likely to be affected by a jamming or spoofing attack, the AIS virtual navigation aid position will be correct, since the position transmitted is a true static position and is not derived from GNSS signals, the Department for Transport stressed. If in doubt as to the validity of navigational information, sailors should cross-reference AIS data with other available methods. If sailors are not able to ascertain the vessel’s position relative to navigational hazards, then the vessel should be brought to a safe stop. Preparation through diligent passage planning is important, identifying where effective crosschecks

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