KADYROV &THE KREMLIN

Q& A WITH PROFESSOR MARK GALEOTTI

Since the official end of the Second Chechen War, the region’s status within Russia has remained uniquely complex, with a mutual reliance on Moscow propping up two authoritarian regimes

Mark Galeotti is Honorary Professor at University College London’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies, as well as the head of the Mayak Intelligence consultancy. He has published multiple books and ar ticles on Russian history, and is a frequent commentator on the nation’s political affairs, par ticularly with regards to the war in Ukraine.

His book Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994- 2009, originally published in 2014, has now been updated with 50 new images and additional analysis of the events of the last decade in Ukraine. Here he discusses the current and potential impact of the conflict in Ukraine on Chechnya and its oppressive regime under Ramzan Kadyrov. The new edition of Mark’s book is on sale January 2024. For more information visit ospreypublishing.com.

What is the perception of Chechnya, and Chechens, among Russian society in general? Chechens are, to be blunt, feared and resented, more so, I think, than any other ethnic group within the Russian Federation, and that applies as much to the latte-sipping metropolitans in Moscow as grizzled factory workers in the Siberian rust belt. In part, this is because of the (heavily my thologised) brutality of Chechen organised crime, in part the experiences of the Chechen war and the associated mass terrorist attacks (with thousands being seized as hostages in hospitals in 1996 and 1995, a theatre in 2002 and a school in 2004) and in part a rich vein of 19th-century ‘colonial literature’ in which the wily and indomitable Chechen was a recurring threat to Russian imperial expansion.

Why did the Kremlin choose to militarily crush Chechen independence, when it had allowed other nations to separate without a shot fired?

Ukraine, Georgia and the rest of the other states that acquired independence at the end of 1991 had been notionally separate nations within the wider Soviet Union, whereas Chechnya was a part of the Russian Federation itself. As a result, Moscow feared that if it let it go, it would simply embolden other parts of the Federation, which would quickly unravel.

Chechnya had not only to be kept within the fold, this had to be done with such a heavy hand that any other potential separatists were deterred. After the First Chechen War, in which the rebels essentially fought Moscow to a draw, it was not only vital that they be taught a bloody lesson, but it would be essential to the rise of Vladimir Putin that he demonstrate that he could win where his predecessor Boris Yeltsin had failed.

Is there still an active Chechen resistance movement? Where, and how much support does it have?

Chechnya today is under the vicious personalistic authoritar